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Recovery For Pain and Suffering Under The 
Criminal Injuries Compensation Schemes*
PETER BURNS**
This paper analyses the recoverability fo r  pain and suffering as a 
head o f  damage under the criminal injuries compensation schemes 
in Canada and elsewhere. Practice varies from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction and the reasons put forward to justify exclusion o f  
recovery o f  this class o f  damage are examined. The conclusion 
reached is that a “true” compensation scheme should allow such 
recovery and that the real reason for excluding it is political expedience, 
i.e., a legislature can give the appearance o f  compensating victims 
o f crime without the fiscal consequences o f  completely doing so.
Cet article analyse la question de l'indemnisabilité du quantum 
doloris sous les divers régimes d'indemnisation des victimes d'actes 
criminels au Canada et ailleurs. L'auteur examine les diverses 
raisons avancées pour justifier l'exclusion de ce chef de dommage 
et conclut qu'un régime d'indemnisation authentique devrait assurer 
la réparation de ce préjudice et que la raison réelle de son exclusion 
est l'opportunisme politique du corps législatif qui donne l'impres­
sion d'indemniser les victimes sans vouloir assumer la totalité du 
fardeau financier correspondant.
INTRODUCTION
Pain and suffering at common law refers to only the suffering 
attributable to the injury sustained by the victim and to any 
consequential medical treatment. Compensation is awardable for both 
past and future pain and suffering, and both its severity and its duration 
are taken into account. The common law test o f this head of general 
damage is subjective; thus, no award can be made where the victim is 
unconscious and cannot experience pain. This head of general damages 
also extends to cases where a person endures mental suffering from the 
knowledge that his life has been shortened or that his enjoyment of life 
has been curtailed through physical handicap.
All Canadian criminal injuries compensation schemes' award 
damages for pecuniary loss. Non-pecuniary losses stand in a different
»This paper is part o f work in progress dealing with the Canadian Criminal Injuries Compensation 
Boards. T he author wishes to acknowledge the debt he owes to his research assistant, Gordon Phillips.
**L L .B ., 1963, LL.M., 1963 (Otago). Professor, Faculty o f Law, University o f  British Columbia.
‘Hereafter referred to as "compensation schemes”.
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category, and controversial debate continues over the question whether 
they should be compensable and, if so, to what extent.
COMPENSATION FOR NON-PECUNIARY DAMAGE UNDER 
CANADIAN COMPENSATION SCHEMES
The non-pecuniary loss most often compensated in Canada is “pain 
and suffering”. Newfoundland,2 Ontario,3 and the Yukon4 specifically 
provide that compensation may be awarded for pain and suffering. Both 
Newfoundland and the Yukon specify that the pain and suffering must 
result from the victim’s injury, while Ontario does not include this 
requirement. This omission in the case o f Ontario is insignificant, for 
the purpose o f such a scheme is clearly to compensate only that damage 
which flows from the victim’s injury.
In none o f those three jurisdictions must the pain and suffering be 
experienced by the victim. In theory this could mean that awards for 
pain and suffering could be made to a party, other than the victim, who 
is able to appear before the Board as a claimant. In each jurisdiction, for 
example, a dependent of the victim may make a claim before the Board. 
Could that dependent receive an award under the head of pain and 
suffering? In this context it is particularly noteworthy that 
Newfoundland’s original act awarded damages for “pain and suffering 
of the victim”5 but was later amended to read “other pecuniary loss or 
damages, including pain and suffering, resulting from  the victim's 
injury . . .”.6 The pain and suffering would seem then to extend to 
include that experienced by persons other than the victim.
Two other jurisdictions will award compensation under the head of 
pain and suffering. Saskatchewan restricts such an award to “pain and 
suffering o f  the victim”7 and New Brunswick restricts compensation to 
“pain and suffering, where the award is fo r  the benefit o f  a victim”.8
Accordingly, there are five jurisdictions in which awards may be 
made specifically for pain and suffering under the particular statutory 
scheme. In two of them the pain and suffering must be that experienced 
by the victim. In three of them this is not specified in the legislation and 
in each of these it is at least possible for the dependent o f a deceased 
victim to apply for an award under this head.
iCnminal Injuries Compensation Act, S. Nfld. 1968, no. 26, s. 16(i>).
3The Compensation fo r  Victims o f  Crime Act, S.O. 1971, c. 51, s. 7(1 )(d).
4Compensation fo r  Victims o f  Crime Ordinance, O .Y.T. 1975, (1st), c. 2, s. 4(1 )(<•).
upra, footnote 2.
‘Criminal Injuries Compensation Act, S. Nfld. 1973, no. 94, s. 5 (emphasis added).
7The Criminal Injuries Compensation Act, S.S. 1978, c. 47, s. 13(f) (emphasis added).
8Compensation fo r  Victims o f  Crime Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. (M 4 , s. 17(l(<f) (emphasis added).
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As a rule, the dependents o f a victim may make a claim before the 
Board only if the victim has died.9 However, even if the victim is alive a 
claim may be made by a person responsible for his maintenance. This 
has been allowed from the outset in Ontario10 and the Yukon.11 That 
person, generally a parent or spouse, could apparently make a claim 
for pain and suffering. This was not originally permitted in 
Newfoundland, where the legislation limited awards to other than the 
victim or his dependents to only “a person, in respect o f pecuniary loss 
suffered or expenses incurred by that person, as a result o f an injury to 
the victim where the maintenance of the victim is the responsibility of 
the person”.12 This was amended in 197313 and in this matter the 
Newfoundland act is now the same as that o f Ontario and the Yukon. In 
all three jurisdictions the heads of damage under which a person 
responsible for the victim’s maintenance may receive compensation are 
nowhere specified. It could be argued that such a person could receive 
compensation under all those heads, including “pain and suffering", for 
which the acts permit compensation without explicitly restricting it to 
only certain persons.
There are, therefore, three classes o f person who may be eligible to 
receive awards for pain and suffering: the victim himself, his 
dependents, and persons responsible for his maintenance.
In Ontario, awards to victims for pain and suffering are common. 
An award has been made to a dependent widower in respect o f the pain 
and suffering he experienced upon the death of his spouse,14 but he 
appears to have been claiming as a victim in his own right. It is not 
clear, however, if a person responsible for the maintenance of the victim 
has ever been awarded compensation for pain and suffering that he 
experienced. There are many cases in which the parent of an injured 
child has appeared as an applicant before the Board and received 
compensation for pain and suffering,15 but such compensation seems to 
have been made in respect of the pain and suffering experienced by the
“Ontario Act, s. 5(f)-, Yukon Territory Ordinance, s. 3(d,e,f). T he original Newfoundland Act did not 
specify that compensation could be awarded to a dependent only if the victim perished but this was 
amended by S. Nfld. 1973, no. 94, s. 3 to agree with the other provinces.
"‘Supra, footnote 3, at s. 5(f).
11Supra, footnote 4, at s. 3( 1 )(#•).
1lSupra, footnote 2, as s. 13( 1 )(#).
,3Supra, footnote 6, at s. 3.
'H)ntano Sinth Report, award no. 200-157, at 1 I .
'^Jntano Eighth Report, uward no. 200-2059, at 29; award o. 200-2237, at 34; award no. 200-2346, at 38; 
award no. 200-2419, at 40; award no. 200-2514, at 41; award no. 200-2580, at 43; award no. 200-2697,
at 45; award no. 200-2704, at 45.
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child and the awards seem to have been made for the child’s benefit.16 
There is only one reported award which seems to suggest that a 
distressed parent could recover for the pain and suffering he or she 
might experience upon the death of, or injury to, his or her child. The 
report of that award reads:
The applicant was the mother o f a 15 year-old girl who was found in the 
river under a bridge near Tillsonburg. As a result o f the incident the mother 
suffered a mental breakdown and required psychiatric treatment. Award:
$2 , 162.00.17
It is not clear from this report if the award contained some element 
in respect o f the applicant’s pain and suffering as a result o f her child’s 
death, or if it reflected merely the expenses the applicant had incurred 
in seeking and obtaining psychiatric treatment. However, the full 
transcript o f the case does reveal that the mother was claiming as a 
victim herself rather than as a person responsible for the maintenance of 
the daughter/victim. Miers18 quotes the Chairman o f the Ontario Board 
as saying,
[The mother’s ] . . . condition was distinguishable and much more serious than 
that o f a parent simply grieving over the loss o f a child. Compensation for 
mourning and for sorrow because o f the loss of a loved one should not be 
awarded under the present legislation. . . .
Another case came before the Board one year later. The published 
report shows that the Board is not disposed to award compensation in 
respect of the pain and suffering experienced by a parent by reason of 
the injuries suffered by their child.19
The victim, aged 19, died as a result of injuries sustained during a brawl at a 
Toronto restaurant. The applicant, the mother o f the victim, incurred no 
financial loss as the result o f the death o f her son. While the Board has every 
sympathy for the applicant no award could be made.
It is unclear from this abstract if the mother could have been awarded 
compensation in respect of pain and suffering. The manner in which 
the mother presented her claim is not detailed, and she may have made 
no claim for an award under the head o f pain and suffering. Thus, the 
fact that an award was not made does not negate the possibility that such 
an award might have been made had it been requested.
There is only one reported case20 in which a dependent o f a 
deceased victim recovered uncfer this head, which may indicate that the
'•For example, in award no. 200-2177 (Ontario Eighth Report, at 32) the monies awarded in respect o f 
pain and suffering were to be paid to the Accountant o f  the Supreme Court o f Ontario, presumably in 
trust for the applicant's son, the victim.
17Ontario Fourth Report, award no. 100-84, at 40.
'* 0 . Miers, Responses to Victimization (Oxford: Professional Book Ltd., 1978), at ISO.
'*Ontano Fifth Report, award no. 200-514, at 75.
t*Ontario Ninth Report, award no. 200-157, at I I .
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Ontario Board in awarding damages for a dependent’s pain and 
suffering will insist upon more suffering than it requires when it makes 
such an award for the benefit of a victim himself. After all, a certain 
amount of suffering will normally be experienced by the dependent of 
the victim who is killed by a criminal, and the paucity of awards under 
this head suggests that a very substantial amount of suffering is a 
prerequisite to compensation. If this is the case it may well be that the 
parents of a deceased child victim have not, in any of the cases which 
have so far come before the Board, experienced “enough” suffering for 
the Board to feel that an award under the head of pain and suffering is 
warranted.21 Just as at common law, recovery for mere “g rief’ is not 
permitted, but awards for real pain and suffering by dependents and 
persons responsible for the victim’s maintenance should theoretically be 
available. The matter is still open.
In summary, awards for pain and suffering are explicitly permitted 
in Newfoundland, Ontario, the Yukon, Saskatchewan, and New 
Brunswick. In all jurisdictions such awards may be made to the victim 
for the pain and suffering he experiences himself. In Ontario, 
Newfoundland, and the Yukon it is at least possible that awards may be 
made in respect of the pain and suffering experienced by either the 
victim’s dependents or (theoretically) a person responsible for the 
victim’s maintenance. All that is known for certain is that in Ontario the 
dependents of a deceased victim may receive compensation for the pain 
and suffering that they themselves experience. Such pain and suffering 
does not appear to found an award at law 22 and in this respect the 
scheme in Ontario, and possibly the schemes in Newfoundland and the 
Yukon, deviate markedly from the principles o f the common law.
In Alberta, compensation may be awarded under any one or more 
of five heads.23 None of those heads, with the possible exception of 
“maintenance of a child born as a result of rape”, includes compensation 
for non-pecuniary damage. Although the Alberta legislation does not 
specify that it is only in respect of one of those five heads that 
compensation may be awarded, such is its clear intention. This view' is 
strengthened by the fact that the act does provide for payments in 
respect of pain and suffering in one particular circumstance.
Where the injury to a person occurred [while he was endeavouring to assist 
any person, preserve the peace, or assist a peace officer in carrying out his 
duties with respect to law enforcement] the Board may, in addition to [the 
five enumerated heads o f pecuniary loss], award compensation to the injured
11 Indeed, there seems to be nothing in the Ontario Statute which would prohibit a person responsible 
for the maintenance o f  a victim from receiving an award for pain and suffering experienced as a result 
o f that victim’s death while permitting the dependent o f the victim to receive such an award.
**Blake v. Midland Rati Co. (1852), 1 18 F..R. 35 (Q .B.); Royal Trust Co. v. Canadian Pacific Railway Co. 
(1922), 38 T .L.R. 899, [1922] 3 W.W’.R. 24 (P.C.).
t3The Criminal Injuries Compensation Act, R.S.A. 1970, c. 75, s. 13(1).
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person, in an amount not exceeding $10,000.00, as damages for physical 
disability or disfigurement and pain and suffering.24
There is no difficulty in interpreting this provision. The compensation 
must be paid to the injured person, and, by implication, it is that 
person’s pain and suffering which alone is compensable.
The situation in Manitoba is similar to that in Alberta. Like Alberta, 
Manitoba lists specific heads under which compensation may be 
awarded.25 They are “expenses”, “maintenance o f a child born as a 
result of rape”, and “other pecuniary loss”. Only the maintenance can be 
seen as non-pecuniary loss26 and that only with difficulty. Manitoba’s 
scheme is somewhat more generous to Good Samaritans.
Where the injury to a person occurred [while he was endeavouring to arrest 
any person, preserve the peace, assist a peace officer in carrying out his duties 
with respect to law enforcement in Manitoba, or prevent lawfully the 
commission o f a criminal offence or suspected criminal offence] the Board 
may, in addition to [the three heads o f pecuniary damage available to any 
claimant] award compensation to the injured person, in an amount not 
exceeding $15,000.00, as damages for physical disability or disfigurement and 
pain and suffering.27
In the Manitoba Legislative Assembly the Attorney-General explained 
why pain and suffering are not compensated under that act:
In addition, it was felt that one o f the basic provisions in the Workmen’s 
Compensation Act and the administrative regulations is that a person is 
compensated for their actual economic loss and not for pain and suffering, 
the imaginative assessment of what are purely subjective things. Under 
existing Workmen’s Compensation Regulations there is compensation paid for 
actual disfigurement or loss o f a part o f a physical body, but there is no 
compensation for pain and suffering as such, and it seems to us only logical 
that what ought to be compensable in respect to a workman who’s injured 
while he’s gainfully employed, surely there ought to be the same standard 
applied to a person who has been subjected to injury as a result o f a criminal 
act. So there shouldn't be a double standard, that one should Ik ? able to get 
more if you’re injured as a result o f a criminal act than you would if you were 
gainfully employed. So the amendments will provide that the compensation 
that is paid is for economic loss only, that is loss o f earnings, loss o f what 
otherwise that person would have been entitled to obtain if they hadn’t been 
injured, and loss for actual disfigurement or loss o f any facilities o f the 
human body.2"
1*lbui., at s. 13(2).
*bThe Criminal Injuries Compensation Act, S.M. 1970, c. 56, s. 12(1).
*®There may be an argument that a person suffers no pecuniary loss by having a child. Before the 
Quebec Superior Court in Dame Catafurd et al. v. Docteur Moreau (1st June, 1978, District o f Terrebonne. 
No. 66, 320, as yet unreported), “An actuary and an economist testified that the child would cost 
$5,807.00 over eighteen years but would bring in, in the form of social benefits or allowances $7,557.00, 
thus creating a net surplus o f $1,750.00:" Kouri, "Non-Therapeutic Sterilization — Malpractice, and the 
Issues o f ‘Wrongful Birth’ and ‘Wrongful Life' in Quebec Law”, (1979) 57 Can. Bar Rev. 89 at 98.
17Supra, footnote 25, at ss. 6(l)(ft) and 12(2).
2**( 1971 ), 18 Manitoba Debates 2573 (July 7/71).
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From this it will be seen that pain and suffering are not 
compensated in Manitoba for two reasons. First, the assessment of such 
damage is difficult. Second, victims are viewed as entitled to no more 
compensation than are workmen receiving compensation under the 
Workmen’s Compensation Act. It is not clear whether this second point 
is based upon a matter o f principle, or merely upon the fact that it is the 
Workmen’s Compensation Board which in Manitoba administers the 
criminal injuries compensation scheme, and that it would present some 
problems for the Board to treat in different manners two types of 
claimants who might come before it. As we shall see,29 the Board in 
British Columbia has experienced no difficulty in administering two 
different acts, giving compensation to two different types o f claimants, 
under two different remedial schemes.
From the remarks o f the Manitoba Attorney-General it would seem 
that compensation could be paid for “actual disfigurement or loss o f any 
facilities to the human body”, which might well describe the head of 
non-pecuniary damage known as “the physical injury itself*. But in fact 
the Manitoba scheme does not permit compensation to be paid to a 
general claimant under any non-pecuniary head. In Manitoba, as in 
Alberta, only the “Good Samaritan” may receive an award under a head 
of non-pecuniary damage, and that head is “damages for physical 
disability or disfigurement and pain and suffering ”. In Alberta at least 
this has been taken to mean simply damages for pain and suffering.30
The act in the Northwest Territories lists six heads under which 
compensation may be awarded.31 The fifth head is broadly similar to 
that of the Yukon and o f Newfoundland and reads:
Other pecuniary loss or damages resulting from a victim's injury and anv 
expense that, in the opinion o f the judge, it is reasonable to incur.
The fifth head in the Yukon reads:32
Other pecuniary loss or damages including pain and suffering resulting from 
the victim’s injury and any expense that, in the opinion o f the judge, it is 
reasonable to incur.
If, in fact, pain and suffering were pecuniary losses or damage, as the 
Yukon act would seem to suggest, then they are indeed compensable in 
the Northwest Territories, and in every other jurisdiction of Canada.
2*lnfra, at 64-68.
30That the Alberta Board considered the "physical disability or disfigurement'' portion to be 
unnecessary and included in "pain and suffering" was made clear in the Alberta First Report where, at 25 
et seq., it described this head as "pain and suffering" smpluiter.
3,Cnminal Injuries Compensation Ordinance, O .N.W .T. 1973, (1st), c. 4, s. 5(1). In Re Evans, (1978) 3 
A.C.W.S. 162, I allis J .  held that compensation for pain and suffering was not recoverable under the 
Northwest Territories scheme because it was not specifically included.
32Supra, footnote 5, at s. 4( I )(#•) (emphasis added).
54 U.N.B. LAW JOURNAL • REVUE DE DROIT U.N.-B.
But it is universally accepted that “pain and suffering” is a 
non-pecuniary, and not a pecuniary, head of damage.
That pain and suffering are not compensable in the Northwest 
Territories was made clear by the Legal Advisor to the Northwest 
Territories Council, in the Northwest Territories Council debates.33
Claims for pain and suffering would be entertained by the court in what are 
called good Samaritan cases, for instance when a person is aiding a peace 
officer or attempting to prevent a crime. Otherwise if he is a victim as a result 
o f a crime committed against him or an innocent victim o f a crime nothing is 
awarded for pain and suffering. The only province that does get this right is 
Ontario as it makes awards for pain and suffering. No other province does 
this except in the good Samaritan cases. There is one exception in this bill . .
[T]his bill’s basic thrust is more to the point o f view o f pecuniary losses.
T o include pain and suffering as a general head o f damage means that 
anybody who receives a punch in the nose could claim the minimum under 
pain and suffering. This would increase the number of claims under this to a 
very considerable degree. It also makes the task o f ascertaining the damages 
very difficult.
The exception referred to by the Legal Advisor is found in one 
rather anomalous head of compensation. In the Northwest Territories 
compensation may be awarded for “humiliation, sadness and embar­
rassment caused by disfigurement”.34 No explanation was given as to 
why this head of damage was included. It is true that the inclusion of 
such a head would probably not increase the number of claims to a 
considerable degree, as was feared would be the result if “pain and 
suffering” was included as a compensable head. On the other hand the 
statement that the task of ascertaining damages for pain and suffering 
would be very difficult certainly applies to the task of ascertaining 
damages under this head also. The only significant difference between 
pain and suffering, and humiliation, sadness and embarrassment caused 
by disfigurement seems to be that disfigurement is easily and objectively 
ascertainable whereas pain and suffering is not. But even though the 
disfigurement is easily ascertainable, the humiliation, sadness or 
embarrassment resulting therefrom is not. Furthermore, it is as difficult 
to convert such humiliation into monetary terms as it is to convert pain 
and suffering. This sixth head of compensation in the Northwest 
Territories must be regarded merely as a legislative anomaly..
The schemes in Quebec and in British Columbia remain to be 
discussed. They differ in one significant respect from those in the other 
Canadian jurisdictions. Both are administered by the Workmen’s 
Compensation Boards, and neither enunciates in its statute a list of 
compensable heads o f damage. The only other Canadian jurisdiction 
whose scheme is administered by the provincial Workmen’s Compensa-
33[ 1973] Northwest Territories Council Debates at 926. See also Re Evans, supra, footnote 3 1.
■'■‘Supra, footnote 31, at s. 5( I ){f).
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tion Board is Manitoba. Manitoba’s act specifies that the amount o f the 
benefits payable to a victim of a criminal act shall be equivalent to the 
benefits that would have been payable had the victim been a workman with­
in the meaning o f the Workmen’s Compensation Act who had been injured in 
the course o f his employment.35 But it is only the amount payable under 
each head, and not the heads themselves, that are referenced to the 
Workmen's Compensation Act. Indeed, the provision just paraphrased is 
made subject to an earlier clause which lists the precise heads of 
compensation. The Manitoba act, despite its Workmen’s Compensation 
aspect, properly belongs with those of the jurisdictions other than British 
Columbia and Quebec which belong in a class by themselves.
Apart from the general right to apply for compensation in Quebec, 
a Good Samaritan, or his dependents if that Good Samaritan has been 
killed, may receive an award for property damage up to a maximum of 
$1,000.38 The Quebec legislation also provides that persons other than 
the victim may receive awards up to a maximum o f $750. if they have 
paid for the victim’s funeral expenses or the cost of transportation of his 
body37 and that the compensation payable to the parents o f a deceased 
child victim is limited to $2,000.38 With the exception of these three 
provisions — and it should be noted that under the third the act does 
not specify the head or heads under which those parents may demand 
compensation — there is only one section which speaks to either heads 
o f compensation or the quanta payable under those heads. That section 
reads:39
The advantages from which a crime victim or his dependents may benefit
under this Act are those provided in divisions (III), (IV') and (V') o f the
Workmen's Compensation Act.
3iSupra, footnote 25, at s. 23(3).
3tCrtmtnal Victims Compensation Act, S.Q. 1971, c. 18, s. 5, as amended bv S.Q. 1976, c. 10. s. 4.
37lbid., at s. 5.
3*lbid., at s. 5. T he view that this $2,000 award represents compensation for the parents' sorrow is 
strengthened by the speech in the Quebec National Assembly o f M. Bellemare (Union Nationale) who 
referred to the sum o f $2,000 in reference to the 1974 murder o f  a youth, an "histoire sordide q u i . . .  a 
impose aux parents de cet enfant une grande souffrance et une perte incalculable" [(1976) 17 Débats de 
l'Assemblée Nationale 1928] as being "disproportioné quant aux malheurs et aux sévices qu'ont subis 
des familles" [Ibid., at 1927]. On the other hand, he also referred to the financial loss when he said I hat _ 
"Aujourd'hui, deux ou trois ans après l'événement, les dépenses encourues ont été terribles dans le 
temps. [$2.000] n’est pas beaucoup." [Ibid.. at 1928],
Bur it seems that the government had in mind the loss o f  the support that the parents could have 
expected from their child when he grew up, hence the sum o f $2,000 represents this pecuniary loss. M. 
Levesque (Liberal) declared that his advisors "en sont arrivés à ce chiffre qui est la moyenne des 
sommes qui sont . . . édictées par les tribunaux." [Ibid., at 1929]. Those sums, as M. (.hoquette (Liberal) 
then pointed out, must "représenter l’expectative de soutien futur pour les parents qu'ont procuré cet 
enfant." [Ibid., at 1929]. I’he government thus seems to have been imagining this $2,000 sum as 
representing the loss o f the child's support once he grew up.
Accordingly, this head o f compensation is viewed as one going to presumptive pecuniary loss.
3*Supra. footnote 36, at s. 4.
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In addition, any mother who is herself providing for the maintenance of 
a child born as the result o f rape may be granted, for the maintenance o f the 
child a monthly payment o f compensation equally to that granted under the 
Workmen's Compensation Act to a widow having one child. However, payment of 
the benefit may be made to a person other than the mother if, due to the 
death o f the mother or for other cause, such person provides for the 
maintenance o f the child to the satisfaction o f the Commission.
To an anglophone, the word “advantages” (the word in French is 
“avantages”) may be thought to refer, perhaps, only to the quantum and 
not to the heads o f compensation. That is the situation in Manitoba 
where the Workmen’s Compensation scheme is used to determine the 
limits of compensation payable under each head but not the heads of 
compensation themselves. But there is no reason to believe that this is 
the situation in Quebec, where the act contains no clause specifying 
those heads of compensation. It seems that the heads o f compensation as 
well as the quantum of compensation payable under those heads are to 
be found in Divisions (III), (IV) and (V) of the Quebec Workmen’s 
Compensation Act. For if pain and suffering were to be compensable, 
what limits would be placed upon compensation payable under this 
head? No limits are specified in the act establishing the criminal injuries 
compensation scheme. Neither are limits specified under the Workmen’s 
Compensation Act, for the simple reason that pain and suffering is not 
compensable under that act. If pain and suffering were to be 
compensable in Quebec, awards under that head would be subject to no 
limit. Since awards under every head in every other province and under 
every other head in the province of Quebec itself are subject to statutory 
limits, this would be a very strange result. The only sensible explanation 
is that pain and suffering — and loss o f amenities of life and loss of 
expectation of life — are not compensable under the Quebec scheme.
In the debates of the National Assembly the Attorney-General felt it 
self-evident that a compensation scheme should parallel the Workmen’s 
Compensation scheme.40
[N]ous avons suggéré des barèmes d'indemnité. Nous avons suggéré que les 
barèmes soient ceux qui s’appliquent en matière d’accidents du travail. Je 
pense que cette suggestion rend à la fois justice à ceux qui peuvent être 
victimes de crimes violents et également à ceux qui sont des accidentés du 
travail. Ne semblerait-il pas légèrement contradictoire, sinon illogique, que 
l’Etat indemnise de façon plus généreuse ceux qui sont victimes de crimes que 
ceux qui sont victimes d’accidents du travail? Il me semble, qu’établir une 
discrimination entre les accidentés du travail et les victimes de crimes violents 
serait une notion malvenue. C’est la raison pour laquelle je me suis rallié à 
cette idée que l’on établisse les barèmes des indemnités attribuables aux 
victims du crime sur la même base que les barèmes des accidentés du travail.
This view was adopted by the spokesman for the Union Nationale:41
Et d’un autre côté, il serait indécent et injuste que les victimes d’actes 
criminels reçoivent plus ou davantage que les compensations vérsées aux 
victimes des accidents du travail.
40(I9 7 I). I I Débats de ¡'Assemblée Nationale 4009 (Nov. 2/71).
"Ibut., al 4017.
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Since these “indecent” and “unjust” results are obtained in most other 
jurisdictions in Canada, the reader may feel that somewhat more o f an 
explanation is called for. In fact the Attorney-General’s argument 
seemed to him to be strengthened by the fact that in British Columbia 
compensation to victims of criminal acts was also referenced to the heads 
and quanta of compensation awarded to workmen injured in the course 
o f their duties:
[L]e système que nous proposons à la Chambre aujourd'hui est assez proche 
du système qui existe en Columbie-Britannique. Cette province possède une 
loi d’indemnisation des victimes d'actes criminels qui. justement, se base sur 
les barèmes payés en matière d’accidents du travail. Nous avons donc suivi 
l’exemple de cette province, sans suivre l’exemple d’autres provinces 
canadiennes où l’on a adopté en gros le project des commissaires visant à 
l’uniformité des lois42
Since the Attorney-General was speaking on November 2nd, 1971, 
and the present British Columbia act did not come into force until 1972, 
he must have been referring to its predecessor “Good Samaritan” 
statute.43 He would undoubtedly be surprised to see how its 
administering board has interpreted and applied the successor to that 
statute.
The act in British Columbia is quite specific concerning the case of 
an award by means of periodic payments. It specifies that compensation 
in the form of periodic payments to a victim disabled by his injuries 
should “be of the same amount and for the same duration as payments 
made to a disabled workman [under certain sections o f the Workers' 
Compensation Act]".*4 Similarly, if the victim died as a result o f the crime, 
payments to his dependants should “be of the same amount and for the 
same duration as payments made to the dependents under [the Workers' 
Compensation Ac/]”.45 These cover the field, for the act specifies that the 
Board “may award compensation to the victim or his dependents as 
provided by this act”,46 and the Board being a creature of statute, and 
being statutorily authorized only to make payments to victims and to the 
dependents of deceased victims, mav make no payment to other persons. 
A person responsible for the maintenance of a child victim may not 
claim for expenditures he makes on behalf o f that victim, as he may do 
in other provinces, but appears before the Board only as agent for the
"Ibid.. at 401».
43Law Enforcement Officers Assistance Compensation Act. S.B.C. 1969, c. 13.
**Cnminal Injuries Compensation Act, S.B.C. 1972, c. 17. s. 3(l)(fr)(i)-
Ailbid., at s. 3(l)(b)(ii).
4#Ibtd., at s. 2(3).
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victim.47 One exception to this is the case of a mother of a child born as 
a result o f rape, who may request maintenance payments.
Medical payments are explicitly authorized in addition to those 
payments which would be made as under the Workers’ Compensation Act. 48 
Once more it must be noted that the section so providing is restricted to 
the case of persons awarded periodic payments.
It must be noted that the British Columbia statute nowhere states 
that the heads specified are the only ones under which compensation 
may be paid to a recipient o f periodic payments. However, that such is 
the case is supportable for three reasons. First, the Board is a creature 
of statute which should find all its powers within the statute and no 
heads other than those just described are found in the British Columbia 
statute. Second, the draughtsmen have described the heads in great 
detail, suggesting that this topic received a great deal o f attention. This 
would be inconsistent with the idea that other heads under which 
compensation could be awarded had simply not been mentioned in the 
act. Third, and perhaps most important, the heads under which 
compensation is permitted in the act contain all those heads under which 
most persons would agree that compensation “should” be made.
O f these three reasons only the first applies to a consideration of 
lump-sum awards, but in respect of the heads o f damage compensable 
under lump-sum awards the act is silent. It provides that periodic 
payments may be transformed into lump-sum payments, whence such 
lump-sum payments would in the final analysis be made under just those 
heads under which periodic payments are made. But concerning awards 
made initially in a lump-sum form the act says little. For example, it 
does not even state explicitly that the Board might make payments in 
respec t o f lost wages. The act does however specify certain minor heads 
of pecuniary damage.49
This silence in the act has given the administrators the power to 
make awards under whatever head they choose. Indeed, awards are 
made under just those non-pecuniary heads of damage that are 
recoverable at common law, and the Board has followed the example of
47Awards may be made onlv to victims and their dependents. Supra, footnote 44, at s. 3(1). The only 
reference in the Act to persons responsible for the maintenance o f a victim is found in s. 10(3), which 
allows him or her to file “for compensation for the infant child o f a deceased victim." But the child may 
make appliiation for expenses paid by his parent, and that parent can represent the child before the 
Board. Neither o f these seems to be expresslv permitted by the Act but the Board's reports are replete 
with cases in which both were allowed. That parent's expenses may be reimbursed directly to him 
(British Columbia Act, s. 3( 1 )(d) ). In effect this gives the parent the right to recover for expenditures 
he makes on the victim's behalf.
*HSupm, footnote 44, at s. 17(1).
48 1 he Board is explicitly authorized to repair artificial limbs, clothing, eyeglasses, dentures and hearing
aids {Ibid., at s. 17(2) ) and to pa\ for his rehabilitation (s. 16).
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other jurisdictions in describing the heads of non-pecuniary damage 
under which it makes awards as actually being pecuniary heads of 
damage.50 In its second report51 the Board stated:
Compensation awards include . . . other pec uniary loss or damages including
and reflecting intangible elements such as pain and suffering, loss of
anemities [and] loss of life expectancy.
It is noteworthy that this silence on the part of the statute has enabled 
the Board in British Columbia to make awards not only for pain and 
suffering, but also for loss o f amenities o f life and for loss o f expectation 
of life. No other Canadian jurisdiction makes awards under the latter 
two heads.
We have already seen that, in addition to the victim himself, his 
dependents may receive awards.52 It might be thought that, as in 
Ontario, the Board in British Columbia would make awards for the pain 
and suffering experienced by other claimants as a result o f the victim’s 
death. Such awards could be made only to the dependents o f a deceased 
victim and not to those persons who have been responsible for the 
victim’s maintenance while alive. We have already noted that in Ontario 
such dependents may receive awards in respect o f their own pain and 
suffering.53 But that position has been rejected in British Columbia in a 
reported award where the Board, while seeming to accept for the sake 
of argument that such pain and suffering had been experienced by the 
dependents o f the deceased victim, stated that, “[cjompensation cannot, 
in any event, be granted for the pain, sorrow and bereavement caused 
by the deceased’s death”.54
In summary, awards under non-pecuniary heads o f damage are not 
made in Quebec. They are made in Alberta and in Manitoba, but only to 
“Good Samaritans”. In the Northwest Territories they are made only in 
respect o f humiliation, sadness and embarrassment brought about bv 
disfigurement. In New Brunswick and Saskatchewan the victim may 
receive compensation for the pain and suffering which he himself has 
experienced. In Newfoundland, Ontario and the Yukon awards may be 
made for the pain and suffering resulting from the victim’s injury or 
death and experienced by the victim himself, his dependents (if he is 
deceased), and those persons responsible for his maintenance. It is not 
known what effect this has in Newfoundland and in the Yukon. In 
Ontario, awards have been made for the pain and suffering experienced 
by the dependents of the deceased victim and may or may not have been
5#Newfoundland, Northwest Territories, and Yukon Territory, (supra, footnotes 31 and 32).
i iBntuh Columbia Second Report, at 4.
S1Supra, f»>oinote 47.
**Supra, footnote 14.
54British Columbia Fifth Report, at 12.
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made — but probably have not been made — for the pain and suffering 
experienced by persons responsible for his maintenance. Finally, in 
British Columbia awards for non-pecuniary damage may be made for 
pain and suffering, loss o f the amenities life and loss of the expectation 
of life, the three heads under which such awards might be made at 
common law. Such awards in British Columbia are restricted to the pain 
and suffering experienced by the victim himself. Jurisdictions refusing 
to make awards under the head of pain and suffering have done so for 
three reasons. Pain and suffering is difficult to assess, it is expensive to 
compensate, and it is not available to equally deserving persons receiving 
benefits under the corresponding Workers’ Compensation Schemes.
COMPENSATION FOR NON-PECUNIARY DAMAGE IN NON- 
CANADIAN JURISDICTIONS
Most United States jurisdictions do not permit awards for 
non-pecuniary damage. Some explicitly prohibit such awards.55 Most 
exclude them either by specifying those heads under which compensa­
tion may be awarded and including only heads o f pecuniary damage in 
that list,56 or by referencing their awards to those made under Workers’ 
Compensation Plans, which never include compensation for non- 
pecuniary damage.57 Many of the states58 follow the same pattern as 
Manitoba, giving unemployed persons compensation for presumptively 
lost wages. Although such compensation cannot be said to reflect 
pecuniary loss, neither does it reflect non-pecuniary loss.
Some jurisdictions expressly provide for pecuniary loss which is 
compensable if that pecuniary loss arises from pain and suffering.59 This 
would seem to be superfluous, for pecuniary loss arising from pain and 
suffering which in turn arises from the victimization is nothing more 
than pecuniary loss arising from the victimization itself. Problems of 
causation can play a role here, but it is likely that pecuniary loss
55For example, Illinois {Illinois Annotated Statutes, c. 70, ss. 74, 776), Oregon (Oregon Revised Statutes, c. 
147, s 035(2((a) ), and Tennessee (Tennessee Code Annotated. Title 23, c. 35, s. 06 (5)(r)).
*®For example. New Jersey (New Jersey Statutes Annotated, Title 32, c. 413, s. 12) and Virginia (Virginia 
Code Annotated, c. 19.2, s. 368.1 IB). Some Slates allow recovery only for "economic loss”, as for example 
Kansas (Kansas Statutes Annotated, c. 74, s. 7302), Minnesota (Minnesota Statutes Annotated, c. 299B, s. 04) 
and Ohio (Ohio Revised Code Annotated, c. 2743, s. 5 1 ( i ) ). Others allow recovery only for “out-of-pocket 
loss”, as for example Kentucky (Kentucky Revised Statutes, c. 346, s. 130(3)), Massachusetts (Massachusetts 
Annotated Laws, c. 258A, s. 5) and Michigan (Michigan Compiled Laws Annotated, c. 18, s. 361).
57For example, Florida (Florida Statutes Annotated, c. 960, s. 13), Maryland (Maryland Annotated Code, 
Artic le 26A. s. 12(6)) and Wisconsin (Wisconsin Statutes Annotated, c. 949, s, 06).
5*For example, Florida (Florida Statutes Annotated, c. 960, s. 13(3)), Maryland (Maryland Annotated Code, 
Article 26A, s. 12(6)).
»»For example, Kansas (Kansas Statutes Annotated, c. 74, s. 7301 ( i ) ), North Dakota (North Dakota Century 
Code, c. 65-13, s. 0 3 (6 )), and Ohio (Ohio Revised Code Annotated, c. 2743, s. 51(#) ).
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resulting from the pain and suffering which in turn results from the 
victimization is compensable even in those United States jurisdictions 
which are silent on this matter. An exception is Tennessee:60
No compensation shall be awarded for any personal injury or loss alleged to 
have been incurred as a result o f pain and suffering, except for victims o f the 
crime of rape and victims o f crime involving sexual deviancy.
Compensation for the pain and suffering itself, rather than 
pecuniary loss arising therefrom, is expressly permitted in Hawaii.61
The Criminal Injuries Compensation Commission may order the payment of 
compensation under this Part f o r . . .  pain and suffering to the private 
citizen. . . .
It is at least arguable also that compensation for pain and suffering 
may be awarded in Alaska where the scheme provides:62
The Board may order the payment o f compensation under this Chapter for 
(I) expenses actually and reasonably incurred as the result o f the personal 
injury or death o f a victim; (2) loss o f earning power as a result o f total or 
partial incapacity o f the victim; (3) pecuniary loss to the dependents o f the 
deceased victim; and (4) any other loss resulting from the personal injury or 
death of the victim which the Board determines to be reasonable.
The use o f the unqualified word “loss” in clause 4 is in direct contrast to 
the qualified phrase “pecuniary loss” in clause 3. It could be argued that 
the loss referred to in clause 4 includes not only pecuniary but also 
non-pecuniary loss. On the other hand, the word “loss”, unlike the word 
“damages”, automatically suggests pecuniary loss only. Only in Hawaii, 
then, is pain and suffering explicitly compensable in the United States.
In the United Kingdom compensation for non-pecuniary damage is 
clearly awardable, because “compensation will be assessed on the basis of 
common law damages”.63 The only head of damage under which 
compensation is expressly prohibited is that o f exemplary or punitive 
damages.64 The Criminal Injuries Compensation Board has also made it 
clear that certain claimants may receive compensation in respect of pain 
and suffering.
The Board will consider applications for compensation arising out o f rape 
and sexual assaults, both in respect of pain, suffering and shock and in 
respect o f loss of earnings . . . and . . .  in respect o f tbe expenses o f child
birth.65____________________________________________________________________________
%0Tennessee Code Annotated, Title 23. c. 35, t. 065(f).
Hawaii R eined Statutes, s. 351-52(4).
**Alaska Statutes, T itle 18, c. 67, s. 110.
63Eleventh Report o f  the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, (1975), cmnd. 5291, at 28, para. 10.
9*llnd., at 29, para. 11. 
tslbid., at 28, para. 9.
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Such com pensation may not be for the pain and suffering experienced 
by the dependents o f a deceased victim: “[T]he com pensation is based 
on the actual pecuniary loss suffered . . .  by the victim’s dependents 
and . . . there is no paym ent for the sorrow, pain and suffering caused 
by the bereavem ent”.66
T h e  situation is slightly d ifferent when the claimant is the person 
responsible for the victim’s m aintenance, ra ther than his dependent: “ In 
Scottish cases, the law o f Scotland enables us to make an award in 
respect o f  [the grief o f  the parents o f a deceased child victim], but in 
England and Wales we can do no m ore than pay the funeral 
expenses”.67
In New Zealand victims o f  crimes, like victims o f o ther accidents, 
may receive com pensation for non-pecuniary dam age.68
Where a person suffers personal injury by accident in respect o f  which he has 
cover under this Act, there may be paid to him . . .  a further lump sum by 
way o f  compensation . . .  in respect o f  —
(a) the loss suffered by a person o f amenities or capacity for enjoying life.
including loss from disfigurement; and 
(¿>) pain and mental suffering, including nervous shock and neurosis:
Provided that no such compensation shall be payable in respect o f  that loss, 
pain or suffering unless . . . [it] . .  . has been or is or may become o f a 
sufficient degree to justify payment o f  compensation under this 
subsection . . . .
Since the com pensation aw arded in respect o f  these heads must be 
paid to the victim himself, it is clearly his pain and suffering that is 
com pensated. T he  ambiguity in the legislation o f certain Canadian 
jurisdictions is not present in New Zealand.
In only two Australian states, Tasm ania and Victoria, does the 
respective legislation list the heads o f dam age u nder which com pensa­
tion may be made. In Tasm ania com pensation may be awarded for “the 
pain and suffering o f the victim arising from  the injury”,69 and in 
Victoria, for the “pain and suffering o f the victim”.70
In both Q ueensland and South Australia the claimant receives funds 
from  the state in an am ount equal to that which a court would have 
o rdered  the criminal, if convicted, to pay to him “by way o f 
com pensation for injury suffered [“sustained” in South Australia] by [the 
claimant] by reason o f the commission o f the offence”.71
**Tenth Report of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, (1974), cmnd. 5791, at 6, para. 5.
t7Ibui., at 6, para. 5.
8SNew Zealand Statutes Accident Compensation Act, 1972, no. 43, s. 120(1).
**Cnminal Injuries Compensation Act, 1976, no. 32, s. 3(d).
10('.nminal Injuries Compensation Act, 1972, no. 8359, s. I5(i)(r).
71<jueensland Criminal Code Amendment Act, 1968, no. 44, s. 4, inserting s. 633(8) into the Criminal Code;
South Australia Criminal Injuries Compensation Act, 1967, no. 97, s. 4(i).
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In New South Wales,72 the o rd e r which the judge may make against 
the criminal, and which is paid to the victim by the state, is referenced to 
the Crimes Act o f  1900.73 T hat act provides that a sum “be paid out of 
the property  o f  the o ffender to any aggrieved person, by way o f 
com pensation for injury, o r loss, sustained through, o r by reason of, 
such felony”.74 But it is only the sum aw arded in respect o f the injury, 
ra th er than the loss, that is paid by the state.75 Since “injury” has been 
taken to include all dam ages which are recoverable at law and which are 
consequences o f  the victim’s bodily injury,76 this should include all 
non-pecuniary dam ages as well as pecuniary damages.
T h e  legislation in W'estern Australia77 was originally similar to that 
o f  Q ueensland and South Australia, and was in terp re ted 78 to perm it 
com pensation only for m ental and nervous shock as in the to rt in 
Wilkinson v. Downton, 79 but not for m ere “pain and suffering”. A 1976 
am endm ent80 now' perm its com pensation for both injury and loss, but 
neither is defined to include pain and suffering, loss o f the amenities o f 
life, o r loss o f expectation o f life.81 It rem ains to be seen how “injury 
and loss” will be construed.
In sum m ary, the Crim inal Injuries Com pensation Schemes o f the 
bulk o f  the jurisdictions o f the Com monwealth award com pensation in 
respect o f pain and suffering, and frequently u nder all the 
non-pecuniary heads o f  dam age available at common law. This is in 
direct contrast to the situation in the U nited States, where com pensation 
in respect o f non-pecuniary heads is almost totally rejected. T he 
C anadian situation, with some provinces perm itting com pensation for 
non-pecuniary dam ages and some refusing such com pensation, reflects 
this country’s traditional legislative schizophrenia.
7%Criminal Injuries Compensation Act, 1967, no. 14, s. 4(1).
” S.N.S.W. 1900, no. 40.
7,lhid.. s. 427.
7%Criminal Injuries Compensation Act, S.N.S.W. 1967. no. 14. ss. 3(ft). 4(1), 5(1 )(a), and 5(2).
7®See the remarks o f U nder Secretary o f Justice Downs in "Compensation and Restitution for Victims of 
Crime" (1975) 25 Proceedings of the Institute of Criminology, University o f Sydney, at 16.
77Criminal Injuries (Compensation) Act, S.W.A. 1970, no. 69.
7*The Applicant v. Larkin, Withnell, and WUktnson [1967] W'.A.R. 199 (S.C.) at 201.
7®[1897] 2. Q.B. 57.
“ S.W.A. 1976, no. 76.
' “’Injury" means bodily harm, including pregnancy, mental shock, and nervous shock. "Ij >ss” means 
loss o f earnings, loss arising from damage to items of personal apparel and loss arising from the 
necessity to replace or repair spectacles, hearing aids etc. S.W.A. 1969, no. 70, s. 3 (as amended).
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SHOULD NON-PECUNIARY DAMAGE BE COMPENSATED 
UNDER THE SCHEMES?
Reasons for denying com pensation for non-pecuniary loss to victims 
o f  violent crimes fall into two categories. Some o f the reasons are 
pragmatic. F raudulent claims would be m ore difficult to detect than 
would be fraudu len t claims un d er pecuniary heads. T h e  assessment o f 
dam ages u n d er non-pecuniary heads is m uch m ore difficult than is the 
assessment u n d er pecuniary heads. T he  cost o f  a program m e which 
includes non-pecuniary heads o f com pensation will be much higher than 
the cost o f a program m e which does not. If  the scheme is to be 
adm inistered by an existing Board, the natural Board to choose is that 
adm inistering the W orkers’ Com pensation Act. If  such a Board is not 
accustomed to making awards for non-pecuniary loss, it m ight produce 
adm inistrative chaos for the Board to make awards in respect o f  
non-pecuniary loss to victims o f crim e but not to those o ther claimants 
who come before it.
T hose reasons based on principle ra ther than on pragm atism  
inevitably reduce themselves to questions o f  the rationale o f the scheme. 
It was surely a perception o f the rationale behind the scheme which 
enabled the Quebec A ttorney-G eneral82 to state without explanation that 
it was contradictory, if not illogical, for the state to give greater 
com pensation to victims o f  crimes than to victims o f  industrial accidents. 
Perhaps this is the reason why the topic is hardly discussed. W hen it is 
canvassed, the com m entator’s discussion generally reduces itself to a 
statem ent o f his position as to the rationale o f  the scheme, or, in some 
cases, to a statem ent that it would be inconsistent with the schem e’s 
rationale for com pensation to be aw arded in respect o f  non-pecuniary 
dam ages, although that rationale itself is very often not expressed. 
Consider, fo r example, the following statem ent by Morris and Hawkins, 
with em phasis on the last sentence.
One difficult question which arises . . .  is whether compensation should be 
paid not only in respect o f  physical injury and its economic consequences but 
also for the ‘pain and suffering’ attendant upon the injury. Our position is 
that we would not include such an element in our compensation scheme. We 
cannot bear the knife for the victim nor endure his pain; the limit o f  our 
collective responsibility seems to us to be the removal o f the sharper pains o f  
financial suffering from his physical suffering. And from his dependents. Let 
us take an example: should there be compensation for ‘pain and suffering’ in 
a rape case? Many o f  the present schemes include such compensation and 
some o f  the legislative debates make much o f  the woman's suffering and the 
appropriateness o f  financial recompense. One can agree with the suffering 
and yet properly raise the question whether compensation should be 
paid . . . .  But for the misery, pain and degradation o f  the rape, we take the 
rather hard line that no compensation should be paid. Otherwise, we move 
into areas o f  assessment o f  suffering in which money is not a possible balance
*2 Supra, footnote 42.
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and in which any payment we make can only be o f  the heart balm or symbolic 
nature. When we move into that area we exaggerate the proper role o f  
compensation schemes.83
T u rn in g  now to a consideration o f both the pragmatic and the 
theoretical argum ents against the award o f com pensation for non- 
pecuniary damages, it is sometimes suggested that the inclusion o f 
com pensation for non-pecuniary dam age imposes a financial burden on 
the state. In the case o f  A lberta84 the exclusion o f  non-pecuniary heads 
has curtailed awards to less than half the num ber granted in O ntario. 
O n the o ther hand, aw ards in M anitoba for pecuniary loss alone exceed 
those m ade in O ntario  for both pecuniary and non-pecuniary loss 
com bined. It is, therefore, impossible to make a general statem ent that 
the exclusion o f non-pecuniary heads o f com pensation necessarily 
produces a less expensive scheme. T h e  particular scheme and its 
application as a whole must be considered.
T h e  validity o f the argum ent that in o rd er to save adm inistrative 
costs the scheme must be adm inistered by W orkers’ Com pensation 
Boards, and that such boards will be unable to function if they are 
required  to make awards to some claimants in respect o f  non-pecuniary 
loss when they are prohibited from m aking such awards to o ther 
claim ants depends upon the sim ultaneous validity o f two sub-argum ents. 
First, there m ust be sound fiscal reasons for putting  the adm inistration 
o f  the com pensation scheme into the hands o f a pre-existing board. 
Second, it must be that such a board would have difficulty in aw arding 
com pensation for pain and suffering.
T h e  first sub-argum ent is one that is universally taken for granted. 
In fact it seems self-evident that the establishm ent o f  a new board will be 
m uch m ore expensive than will be the utilization o f an existing board. It 
is because this fact seems so self-evident that the au thor has undertaken 
to ascertain its validity. In Fable 1 adm inistrative costs and the total 
monies paid by various C anadian Boards85 in each year since 1970 have 
been detailed. T he  awards m ade in O ntario, British Columbia and 
Alberta show little variation over the years, after the initial year o f the 
program m e with its a ttendant startup  costs has been passed in British 
Columbia and Alberta. Saskatchewan shows an unusual decrease in
*3Morris and Hawkins, The Honest Politicians Guide to Crime Control (Chicago: U. o f Chicago Press, 1970), 
at 44-5.
"Mil 1971 awards in respect of pecuniary loss averaged $676.00 in Alberta and $807.00 in Ontario. 
Since Ontario also made awards in respect o f non-pecuniary damage, the average award in Ontario was 
$1,892.00. This is almost three times the average award made in Alberta in that year. It is evident that 
the failure to award compensation for non-pecuniary loss in Alberta has significantly decreased the 
average award. Sources: Ontario Third Report, Alberta Annual Report (¡971).
si()nly the compensation schemes in four provinces have been considered because the public accounts 
do not break down the schemes’ budgets into administrative expenses and monies disbursed to 
claimants in the other jurisdictions. In New Brunswick, the Yukon Territories, and the Northwest 
Territories the schemes are administered by the courts and so can tell us nothing when comparing the 
relative costs o f  schemes.
Table 1. Costs o f adm inistering Criminal Injuries Com pensation 
Schemes in four Canadian provinces du ring  the 1970’s.
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Province Year




A dm inistration  Costs 
as a P ercentage o f  
M onies Paid
O ntario88 1970-71 __ — —
1971-72 100,637 399,811 25
1972-73 193,144 615,413 32
1973-74 205,317 730,401 28
1974-75 259,073 726,880 36
1975-76 306,090 899,785 34
1976-77 394,496 1,410,812 28
1977-78 427,533 1,629,896 26
T O T A L 1,886,290 6,412,998 29
British 1970-71
Colum bia87 1971-72 --- — —
1972-73 --- — —
1973-74 62,333 193,896 32
1974-75 116,921 585,939 20
1975-76 143,095 858,246 17
1976-77 251,997 1,241,282 20
1977-78 269,942 1,230,681 22
T O T A L 844,288 4,110,044 20.5
"‘Since the publication of its Fifth Annual Report the Ontario Board has not shown the cost of 
administering its scheme. This has forced us to go to the Public Accounts o f Ontario to obtain such 
data. It was only in the fiscal year 1971-1972 that those Public Accounts began to show the money 
disbursed by the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board for administrative expenses. So the table for 
O ntario only starts in that year. The Ontario Second Report gives data for 1970, but that data is for the 
calendar rather than the fiscal year, and it would be misleading to insert such data in a table all of 
whose other entries refer to the fiscal year.
Sources: Volume 1. Public Accounts of Ontario, 1977-78 at 227, 1976-77 at 218, 1975-76 at 209, 1974-75 
at 187, 1973-74 at 174, 1972-73 at 147, 1971-72 at 185.
1,7The Public Accounts o f British Columbia do not detail the administrative expenses o f  the Criminal 
Injuries Compensation Board The data has been taken from the Board’s Annual Reports. Such data 
w ill not be precisely comparable with that from the other jurisdictions, for the Board’s reports speak of 
monies awarded while the Public Accounts speak of monies paid. “Monies paid” will include periodic 
payments in respect o f awards made in previous years as well as monies awarded towards the end of the 
previous year which the claimant did not pick up in the vear o f the award. O n the other hand, it will 
not include monies awarded in this year which tbe claimant has not yet received. These may balance 
out, as in 1976-1977 when the Ontario Board's Eighth Report showed a total of $1,423,640.00 paid to 
claimants, whereas the provincial auditors’ Public Accounts showed a total of $1,410,812.00. T his 
discrepancy o f less than 1% cannot affect the figures. On the other hand, in 1977-78 the Ontano Board's 
Ninth Report showed a total o f $1,310,699.00 awarded, whereas the Public Accounts show a total of 
$1,629,896.00 paid. This discrepancy is over 25% and would affect the figures. However, we have no 
f igures to use for British Columbia other than those given by the Board in its reports.
Sources: British Columbia Sixth Annual Report at 7, Fifth Report at 7, Fourth Report at 9, Third Report at 6 
and Second Report at 6. The First Report represented only a portion of 1972, only 31 awards in all, and so 
we do not include the costs of administration or cost o f introductory advertising detailed on page 13 of 
the Board’s First Annual Report. For this reason the table starts with the year 1972. For British Columbia 
the year refers to the calendar year, and so for example 1973-1974 refers to the year 1973.
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Table 1. (continued).
Province Y ear




A dm inistration Costs 
as a P ercentage o f  
M onies Paid
A lberta88 1970-71 __ _ .
1971-72 --- --- _
1972-73 35,552 109,203 32
1973-74 17,968 124,905 14
1974-75 24,989 158,693 15
1975-76 34,994 239,270 15
1976-77 — — __
1977-78 — — ----
T O T A L 113,483 632,071 18
Saskatchewan89 1970-71 24,984 32,546 77
1971-72 24,071 50,216 48
1972-73 26,044 57,529 45
1973-74 19,329 181,408 11
1974-75 18,010 139,290 13
1975-76 17,054 122,956 14
1976-77 19,924 166,464 12
1977-78 37,616 175,843 21
T O T A L 187,032 926,252 20
adm inistrative cost, relative to monies aw arded, starting in the fiscal year 
1973/74 due both to a 200 percent increase in the monies aw arded and 
to a 25 percent d ro p  in the adm inistrative costs. O ne can only speculate 
as to what new policies were im plem ented in that year to bring this 
about.
Over the years tabulated it will be seen that on the average British 
Columbia expended 20.50 on adm inistration for every dollar that it 
aw arded, Alberta expended 180, Saskatchewan expended 200, and 
O ntario  expended 290. In British Columbia the Criminal Injuries 
Com pensation Scheme is adm inistered by the W orkers’ Com pensation 
Board; in the o ther three jurisdictions an independent Board 
adm inisters the scheme. If  one were to com pare British Columbia with 
only O ntario  one would conclude that it is m ore costly to create an 
independent board than it is to utilize a pre-existing board. But when
“ T he Public Accounts o f Alberta show no expenditures for the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board 
before the year 1972-73, and do not detail its administrative expenses after the year 1975-76. 
Therefore, data has been included for only four years.
Sources: Public Accounts uj Alberta, Volume 1, 1972-1973 at 131, 1973-1974 at 83, 1974-1975 at 105, and 
1975-1976 at 106.
““Sources: Public Accounts o f Saskatchewan, 1970-71 at 62, 1971-72 at 61, 1972-73 at 48, 1973-74 at P6I, 
1974-75 at F60, 1975-76 at F39, 1976-77 at F36, and 1977-78. Volume 2 at 36.
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one com pares the figure for British Columbia with those o f Alberta and 
Saskatchewan it becomes clear that such a conclusion would be 
erroneous, based as it would be upon the high cost o f the O ntario  
scheme. T h e  differences between A lberta and Saskatchewan on the one 
hand, and British Columbia on the o ther, are so small that one cannot 
with certainty a ttribu te them  to the fact that the British Columbia 
scheme is adm inistered  by a pre-existing board.
As we have seen, British Colum bia does award com pensation un d er 
the various noil-pecuniary heads. T his destroys the validity o f  the second 
sub-argum ent which presupposes that if a Crim inal Injuries C om pensa­
tion Scheme is to be adm inistered by a W orkers’ Com pensation Board 
then that scheme m ust perm it com pensation only in respect o f heads 
u n d er which com pensation could be aw arded to an injured workman.
It is unclear, then , if the utilization o f a pre-existing board has any 
real effect on the cost o f  the scheme. I f  there  is any such effect, it is so 
small as to afford  no convincing reason for denying aw ards to a great 
many victims. F urtherm ore, even if the W orkers’ Com pensation Board is 
utilized, that Board will experience no problem s in aw arding 
com pensation to victims u nder the heads o f  noil-pecuniary loss. T he  
pragm atic argum ents based on the necessity o f utilizing a pre-existing 
board are not well founded.
T h e  argum ent that the admission o f  com pensation for non- 
pecuniary loss will lead to fraudu len t and inflated claims is based on 
sheer speculation. None o f the Canadian jurisdictions which allow 
com pensation u n d er non-pecuniary heads seems to experience difficulty 
with fraudulent claimants. F raudulen t claimants seem to be defeated by 
the requirem ent, such as that found in M anitoba,90 that “the Board shall 
not make an o rd e r for com pensation . . . where the crim e o f violence 
giving rise to the claim was not reported  within a reasonable time after 
the happening  th e reo f to the p ro p er law enforcem ent officers . . As 
the board in England noted :91
T he requirements . . . that compensation will not be payable unless the Board 
is satisfied that the circumstances o f  the injury have been the subject o f  
criminal proceedings or were reported to the police without delay, normally 
provide a safeguard against fraudulent claims.
Fraudulent claims appear to present no real problem s w hether o r not 
the board allows com pensation for non-pecuniary dam age, and any 
argum ent for refusing such com pensation which is based upon fear o f  
fraudulen t claims is unfounded.
*°Supra, footnote 25, at s. 6(2)(b).
a>Supra, footnote 63, at 8.
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T h e  only rem aining pragmatic argum ent is based on the difficulty 
o f quantifying pain and suffering and then translating it into dollars and 
cents. Such difficulties have been experienced by the courts themselves, 
but “it has been held in num erous cases that uncertainty in the 
quantification o f dam age does not prevent an assessment, provided that 
some broad estim ate can be m ade . . .”.92 It seem c reasonable to assume 
that dam age which is not too uncertain for the courts to assess would 
prove equally susceptible to assessment by a board.
O f course, this uncertainty does suggest that the board might not be 
consistent, and m ight award quite d ifferent sums in respect o f  pain and 
suffering to seemingly indistinguishable claimants. Again, this fear 
appears to be unfounded. An analysis o f  awards m ade in British 
Colum bia for victims o f purse snatching incidents93 shows that thev 
follow' a fairly consistent pattern  and do not appear to vary markedly. At 
any rate it seems strange to charge a board with the disbursem ent o f 
public funds and with the investigation o f  claims, and yet doubt its 
capacity to assess those dam ages which the law itself has assessed for 
centuries. T his is all the m ore odd when one notes that the 
adm inistrators o f the board invariably include at least one lawyer.94
Any valid argum ent against the award o f com pensation for 
non-pecuniary loss m ust be found am ong the theoretical objections. T he  
prim ary theoretical objection has been stated bv the Attorneys-General 
o f both M anitoba and Quebec to be that victims o f  crim e should receive 
no m ore com pensation than victims o f  industrial accidents.95
There are, however, several characteristics shared by victims o f 
violent crim e that are not share bv victims o f industrial accidents, and 
those characteristics show that the form er may be m ore deserving o f 
com pensation for pain and suffering  than  are the latter. For the 
purposes o f  this argum ent the thesis that victims o f industrial accidents 
should not receive com pensation for their pain and suffering is 
accepted, although this thesis itself seems indefensible save from a 
financial view point.
92Munkman. Damages for Personal Injurs and Death, (1973). at 9. T he author there cites some of the 
"numerous cases”.
93T here were sixteen such incidents in the British Columbia Third Report for 1974.
*4In the seven provinces whose schemes are administered bv a board, the board is required to include ;it 
least one lawyer in Alberta (Alberta Act. s. 3(3)) and Manitoba (Manitoba Act. s. 2(3)). In 1977-78 the 
Chairman of the Alberta Board was F.. W atkins, Q.C. In its Ninth Report the Ontario Board contained
two members of seven who were listed as Q.C.’s. The executive secretar\ of the Alberta Board when it 
was first established was Florence Brent. M.D., LL.B. The Chairman o f  the Saskatchewan Board in 1969 
was James Fremko. Q.C. and is currently a practising lawyer. It would seem that the governments have 
chosen, for better or for worse, to include lawyers on their Criminal Injuries Compensation Boards.
**Supra, footnotes 28 and 40.
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I he very young and the very old are found am ong the victims o f 
crim e m ore than they are found am ong the victims o f industrial 
accidents. Figure 1 details the ages o f those 190 victims o f  crim e, o ther 
than peace officers injured in the course o f their duties, whose awards
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were sum m arized and whose ages were given in the Ninth Report o f the 
Ontario Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, and the ages of the 66,233 
recipients o f W orkm en’s Com pensation benefits who have received 
W orkm en’s Com pensation paym ents in British Columbia in 1978.96 In 
o rd er to com pare the two graphs the absolute num ber o f claimants in 
each age category has not been considered. R ather only the fraction o f 
claimants in that age category expressed as a percentage o f the total 
num ber o f  claimants before the board in that year has been considered. 
T he  Figure makes it quite clear that the very young and the very old 
receive m ore benefits from Crim inal Injuries Com pensation schemes 
than they do  from  W orkers’ Com pensation schemes. This suggests that 
such persons are the victims o f  crimes m ore frequently than they are the 
victims o f industrial accidents.
Society may withhold its sympathy from  the victim o f an industrial 
accident to the extent o f refusing him com pensation for pain and 
suffering, for we envision such a victim as one well able to suffer the 
slings and arrows o f  outrageous fortune. But it is only natural to think 
that the pain and suffering resulting from  the psychological traum a 
experienced by a person who is the victim of a violent attack will be 
stronger in the case o f the very young and the very old, two groups 
which are strongly represented am ong the victims o f violent crime.
T h e  natu re o f  the victim is not the only m anner in which claims 
before W orkers’ Com pensation Boards d iffer from claims for Crim inal 
Injuries Com pensation Boards. T he effect on the victim’s psyche from 
the m anner in which the injury occurred will also show a difference. 
Accidents are a part o f daily life, and most persons are at least 
psychologically p repared  to experience them . This is especially so in the 
case o f victims o f  industrial accidents who are frequently injured while 
working near m achinery which, as they know in advance, presents a 
threat. But who is psychologically prepared  to be the victim o f a violent 
attack? T he  typical claimant before the board is an average citizen 
unexpectedly assaulted while walking peacefully down the street. T h e  
very suddenness o f the assault is bound to leave an impression on his 
m ind long afterw ard. Indeed, the reports o f the various Crim inal 
Injuries Com pensation Boards frequently make reference to the anxiety 
experienced by the victim th ereafter97 and to the victim’s inability to face 
society o r to walk the streets after the assault.98 Few workmen injured 
du ring  the course o f their em ploym ent will experience such anxiety o r 
paranoia.
**Sixty-Second Annual Report, for the year ended December 31, 1978. o f the Workers’ Compensation 
Board of British Columbia, Table D at 86.
*7See, for example, British Columbia Third Report award no. '24273, at 1 I ; Fourth Report, award no. 21775, 
at 20; Sixth Report, award no. 56576, at 13; Ontario Ninth Report, award o. 200-3421. at 39; Ontario Eighth 
Report, award no. 200-2268, at 53.
•‘See, for example, Ontario Eighth Report, award no. 200-1940, at 51.
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Finally, one must ask why society com pensates victims o f crimes. If  
such schemes are enacted to soothe the public o r the v ictim " then how 
can one justify w ithholding com pensation for pain and suffering? Take 
the case o f a school girl, covered by provincial health care, who is raped. 
As a school girl she is probably not working and will not lose any wages, 
and as an injured person she will probably not incur any significant 
medical expenses. T o  deny her com pensation for pain and suffering is 
to allow her nothing. This can hardly be said to manifest society’s 
concern for its mem bers, or to help restore those ties which bind society 
together and which were weakened by the assault. As one au tho r noted 
long ago:100
In some crimes, particularly forceable rape, kidnapping and some robberies, 
the unliquidated claim for compensation for pain and suffering is all that the 
victim generally has. Thus, it would appear to mark the victim and play havoc 
with consistency to urge the compensation o f a forceable rape victim . . . and 
in the next breath to reject her claim for pain and suffering.
SUMMARY
A refusal to award com pensation for non-pecuniary dam age is 
sometimes justified on pragmatic and sometimes on philosophical 
grounds. N either o f these grounds appears to be as valid as is frequently 
believed. O ne is forced to the conclusion that there is no acceptable 
rationale for refusing com pensation un d er heads o f non-pecuniary 
dam age, heads which society has, th rough the courts, been willing for 
centuries to com pensate. T h e  continued general refusal to perm it 
recovery u n d er the head o f non-pecuniary dam age leads to the 
inexorable conclusion that such schemes offer incomplete com pensation.
**See. tor example. Compensation for Victims of Crimes of Violence, Home Office, (1964), cmnd. 2323 at 
para. 2; Harland. "( Compensât in g the Victims o f Crime", (1978) 14 Cnm. Law Bull, 203 at 223-224; Law 
Reform Commission ol Canada. Working Paper no. 5, Restitution and Compensation, (1974), at 17.
'•“Starrs, "A Modest Proposal to Knsure Justice o f Victims o f Crimes", (1965) 50 Minn. L.R. 285, at 306.
